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ABSTRACT
We investigate how increased electoral competition — by influencing the equilibrium policies
of competing parties — affects the income distribution in society. Our model is embedded in a
standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages: (i) they allocate resources
across various districts and (ii) then, for each district, they divide the resources among the different
constituent groups. We show that an increase in electoral competition in a district results in a
tendency towards equalization of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from
the Indian national elections which are combined with household-level consumption expenditure
data rounds from NSSO (1987-88 and 2004-05) to yield a panel of Indian districts. We find that
districts which have experienced tight elections exhibit lower inequality and polarization which
indicates a larger “middle class”.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In any democracy, uncertainty over electoral outcomes is likely to influence the proposed poli-
cies of competing political parties, as long as the politicians are office–motivated. Recognizing
that these policies are able to differentially impact the incomes of an income–wise heterogeneous
electorate, leads us to ask the following questions. How do close elections — via their effect
on equilibrium policies — affect the income distribution in society? In particular, does greater
electoral competition reduce or exacerbate existing income disparities? Also, does this lead to
an increase in the size of the “middle class” or not?2 These are precisely the questions we seek
to address here by first constructing a theoretical model and then conducting a related empirical
exercise with data from India.
The literature so far has focused on how resources are targeted to districts which are “non–partisan”
— and hence electorally more unpredictable — as opposed to districts which are strongly inclined
towards some party. Models of political competition which have directly addressed questions of
this nature (see for e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998), etc.)
have generally concluded that non–partisan or “swing” districts get more targeted resources in the
aggregate. Such theoretical findings have been empirically investigated. For instance, Arulam-
palam et al (2009) find evidence, in the case of India, of the central government making transfers
to state governments on the basis of political considerations. They find that a state which is both
aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state
which is unaligned and non-swing. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) investigate political determi-
nants of land reform implementation in the Indian state of West Bengal since the late 1970s. Their
findings are consistent with a quasi-Downsian theory stressing the role of opportunism (re–election
concerns) and electoral competition.
In this paper, we take a step towards investigating which groups within the swing districts get the
larger share of the benefits. Of course, one is tempted to re-apply the “swing group benefits the
most” argument here for analyzing the within–district gains distribution issue. In fact, this raises
the question of what we mean by a group in this context. Moreover, what if one were to enter-
tain the hypothesis that the all groups (whatever may be the classification: income, occupation,
ethnicity, etc.) are all equally ideological ex ante?
We present a simple two–stage model of political competition drawing on ideas from standard
models of probabilistic voting like Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996),
among others. In the first stage, the two competing parties decide on how to allocate resources
to a mutiltude of districts (which comprise the entire nation). In the second stage, the fielded
candidates of these two parties in each district decide on how to allocate the proposed district–
level resources (decided by the party leaders in the prior stage) among the various groups in the
district.3 The members of each group cast their vote based on the transfer promised to them and on
their ideological taste for the parties.
2The rise of India’s “middle class” has been the subject of intense debate in recent times. There have been several
studies (see Topalova (2005) , Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) etc.) which have tried to link the growth of the “middle
class” to the policies of trade liberalization pursued since the 1990s.
3As explained in detail later, we use the term “group” in a rather flexible manner; it could stand for income or occupa-
tion or even ethnicity.
3Our model (re-assuringly) delivers — in line with existing probabilistic voting models — that as
the level of electoral competition increases in the district, the equilibrium level of transfer to that
district increases. In other words, there is greater transfer to the electorally “swing” districts. But
perhaps what is more intriguing is the following. Our model puts us in a position to evaulate the
relative gains to each group (within a district) as the district ceteris paribus becomes more swing.
We deliberately endow each group within a district with the same ideology distribution to switch
off the “swing group benefits the most” channel.
Our main result is that the more “swing” a district — ceteris paribus — the greater the tendency
towards equalization of incomes in that district. The intuition behind this result is quite straight-
forward. Assume that there is some heterogeneity in incomes: both within each group and also
across the groups. Hence, we can call some groups poorer than others. Now take any ideology
distribution (political) within a district and endow every constituent group with this same distri-
bution; this effectively makes every group equally “swing”. In such a situation, it is the poorer
groups which get higher transfers. Why? Note, even though all groups are equally ideologically–
motivated, an additional dollar to the poor delivers a higher marginal utility than it does to the rich.
In equilibrium, the groupwise transfers are meant to equalize the per–capita marginal gain in votes
with respect to transfers (for either of the two parties) across all the groups. Therefore, poorer
groups within a district gain more and this reduces income disparities across the groups for any
given ideology distribution.
Now suppose the ideology distribution for this district changes so as to make it more volatile
electorally, thus more swing. As noted above, the overall transfer to the district increases. Notice,
our earlier intiuition still applies: poorer groups within a district still gain more than their richer
counterparts, and this reduces income disparities across the groups just as before. However, now
there is an additional difference: every group now gets a higher transfer as compared to when
the district was less swing. This implies, for every group, the within–group disparities are now
reduced in relation to the group’s average income; thus, there is lower within-group inequality.
This combination of lower within–group disparity and (similar) across–group convergence is the
key intuition behind our main result.
We then check for the relationship between close elections, income inequality and polarization
for the case of national elections in India.4 Our main variable representing electoral “swing” is
the actual margin of winning; in other words, we look at the difference between the percentage
vote shares of the two parties that obtain the highest number of votes in any constituency. The
two National Sample Survey (NSS) consumer expenditure rounds we utilize have almost 16 years
between them and these intervening years have been witness to several national elections.5
We also experiment with alternative variables for electoral swing; for example, we take an average
of the winning margins over several elections prior to each of the NSS expenditure rounds to
4There is a strong relationship between the size of the middle class and the degree of income polarization in society
(see Esteban and Ray (2010) for a comprehensive discussion). In particular, a high degree of income polarization is
suggestive of society dominated by two income groups — the “haves” and the “have–nots” and thus a smaller middle
class. This is, in principle, quite different from income inequality and from an empirical standpoint most measures of
the two concepts often diverge over various ranges.
5The two rounds are the 43rd round (conducted in 1987-88) and the 61st round (conducted in 2004-05). Also, national
elections take place once every 5 years. Sometimes, they are more frequent. For instance, when the incumbent
government fails a “vote of confidence” (a sign that the ruling party has the support of the majority of the national
legislators) and is forced to resign, fresh elections are called.
4get a measure of the electoral volatility of the districts. The results we get are robust to such
variations: more “swing” districts exhibit lower income inequality. The pattern persists when
we replace winning margin by the vote share of the winning party. There is also evidence of a
similar relationship between polarization and electoral uncertainty. Inter–quartile differences in
expenditure (mean—normalized) are also positively associated with higher winning margins.
Recognizing that the empirical strategy is subject to various concerns of endogeneity (like reverse
causation and omitted variables bias), we employ an instrumental variables approach as an addi-
tional robustness check. We argue that the vote share of any one specific national party in the
district is a good candidate as an instrument for the margin of winning or the vote share of the
winner. So we take the vote share of the Indian National Congress party as the instrumental vari-
able. We believe that the only way a particular party’s performance in the district can affect the
district–level income distribution is through the channel of electoral competition. Moreover, in
several of these districts the Congress party is not the winner, which reinforces our argument that
this specific party’s performance can have no direct effect on the district–level income distribution.
Our results from this 2–SLS IV approach are substantially similar to our previous results. More-
over, to assuage concerns regarding the potential endogeniety of our instrument, we employ the
IIV estimation procedure posited in Nevo and Rosen (2012). By this method, we are able to gen-
erate bounds for our parameter estimates. Our IIV estimation results suggest that our parameter
estimates are significantly different from zero and in the direction of our OLS and 2–SLS results.
In sum, our empirical findings clearly suggest that greater electoral uncertainty reduces existing
income disparities and promotes the growth of the middle class.
Besley et al. (2010) use panel data on US states and find strong evidence that lack of political
competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies. In the spirit of group–specific trans-
fers like in our model, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) posit a model with three kinds of public
goods which differentially affect the welfare of the landed (and hence better-off) and landless (and
hence poor) households.6 In a related vein, the political economy of public goods provision has
been studied in many contexts. For instance, Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) look at the location
of public goods between 1971 and 1991 in about 500 parliamentary constituencies in rural India
to assess the relative importance of social structures as regards the allocation of public resources
over the period. Banerjee et al. (2005) look at the influence of social divisions on public goods
availability in India.
Our paper is in some ways also related to the literature on “clientelism”. Bardhan and Mookherjee
(1999) provide a theoretical framework which can deal with the issue of the connection between
electoral competitiveness and clientelism. However, their main focus is the relationship between
the degree of decentralization and clientelism, whereas here we concentrate on the link between
electoral competitiveness and inequality/polarization. In a related context, Bardhan and Mookher-
jee (2012) posit a theory of clientelism which sheds light on the allocation of public services,
welfare and empirical measurement of government accountability in service delivery. They also
present some empirical evidence using household surveys from rural West Bengal consistent with
their model.
6They show that public expenditure on road-construction programs primarily benefit landless households by increasing
local labor demand and the public purchase of irrigation facilities increases agricultural production and thus raises land
rents which boost the incomes of the landed households.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model designed to
address our main questions. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy and findings and
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. THEORY
2.1. A Model. Suppose that a nation is composed of N districts where N is odd and “large”. We
denote an individual by i and the set of individuals in district n by In. The set In is partitioned
into K ≥ 2 disjoint groups; denote each partition by In(k) where k ∈ {1, ..., K}. Let mnk > 0 be
the number of individuals in group k in district n.7 We assume that the size of the population is
the same in every district n; so
∑K
k=1m
n
k is the same for each n ∈ {1, ..., N}. One can think of
this group marker as either income or ethnicity or occupation; we do not insist on any particular
interpretation.
Within each group (indexed by k) individuals differ in terms of their incomes; we denote the
income of individual i by yi where yi ∈ R. We assume that these K groups have different income
distributions which are discrete.8 In particular, one can order them in terms of group incomes —
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance — so that k = 1 denotes the poorest group and
k = K is the richest.9
There are two political parties A and B who compete for votes in each of these N districts; so
they field candidates in every district. It is useful to think of these parties as national level parties
making their decisions (described in detail below) prior to a national election. The game unfolds
in two stages. In the first stage, before the elections, each party has to decide on the amount of
resources to spend in each district n — call this RAn and R
B
n , respectively — where R
A
n , R
B
n ∈ R
for every n ∈ {1, ..., N}. The aggregate balanced budget condition applies, so that
N∑
n=1
RAn =
N∑
n=1
RBn = 0.
Hence, some districts are net gainers in term of aggregate transfers while others are net losers
according to each party’s allocation rule.10
In the second stage, after the two parties simultaneously choose their cross-district allocations, in
every district n the fielded candidates decide on the division of the transfer (RAn and R
B
n , respec-
tively) across the K groups in the district. Specifically, for j = A,B, party j’s candidate chooses
xn(j) ≡ (xn1 (j), ..., xnK(j)) where xnk(j) ∈ R is the transfer to each member of group k (in district
7The arguments presented here can also accomodate mnk = 0 for some (k, n) combinations. However, for ease of
exposition, we continue to assume mnk > 0 for every k and n.
8Hence, there is a certain (non-negative) mass associated with every income level in the support of the distribution.
9Clearly, interpreting groups as distinct income classes fits our description quite neatly. However, we do not need the
groups to be disjoint in terms of the incomes earned by the group members. Hence, one could think of them as being
different occupational sectors with some heterogeniety in income returns; or for the case of India, as being distinct
caste groups.
10Of course, the actual transfer to the district in equilibrium potentially depends upon the identity of the party which
wins in that district.
6n). Moreover, for every n and j, xn(j) satisfies the following (feasibility) restriction:
K∑
k=1
mnk .x
n
k(j) ≤ Rjn.
So, essentially there are three sets of players. They are:
(a) Parties A and B (or to be more explicit, the party leadership comprising of the senior members,
etc.) who decide on the district level allocations {RAn , RBn }Nn=1.
(b) The party candidates in each district, one for each party and
(c) the individual voters residing in all these districts, i.e.,
⋃
n In.
We describe their actions and payoffs below.
Each party’s payoff is closely tied to the performance at the national level. This they can influence
by their choice of district level allocations {RAn , RBn }Nn=1. We can endow party j (where j = A,B)
with either of the two objectives:
(i) Party j seeks to maximize the probability of winning a majority of the N districts.
(ii) Party j seeks to maximize the expected plurality across all the districts taken together; hence,
maximize the number of votes recieved at the national level.
The objective of any fielded candidate in any district is straightforward: he simply chooses the
division xn(j) — given his rival candidate’s proposed allocation and his own feasibility constraint
— which maximizes his expected plurality (vote share) in the district.
In any district, an individual voter’s preferences over candidates11 (and their proposed allocations)
are described as follows. First, individual i exhibits a bias ai, positive or negative, for party A. The
corresponding bias for B is normalized to be zero, so ai is really a difference. This ideological
bias can stem from many things, say the parties stand on issues other than their redistributive
transfers. Moreover, we assume that individual i draws this bias from a distribution with cdf Fi(.)
and corresponding density fi positive everywhere on R. Also, all such draws are statistically
independent.
The payoff to any voter is a sum of the payoff from the transfer and the ideological bias. Specif-
ically, take the case of voter i ∈ In(k), i.e, an individual in group k in district n. Suppose party
A′s candidate offers him xnk(A) and party B
′s candidate offers him xnk(B). Then, voter i
′ payoff is
u(yi+x
n
k(A))+ai when partyA
′s candidate wins and u(yi+xnk(B))when partyB
′s candidate wins.
Here, u represents the utility function and is standard in the sense that u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. We also
assume that u′′′ ≥ 0.12 Moreover, we assume that the Inada conditions hold so that u′(0) = +∞.
Thus, a voting decision rule for individuals in district n — call it vn — is a mapping from the set
In to the set {A,B} for every n ∈ {1, ..., N}. Given that we have endowed every voter with the
11Here we do not make a distinction between affiliation for a party and affiliation towards the party’s candidate; we
simply look at the overall affiliation towards the party–candidate combination. In some contexts, it may make sense to
unpack these terms. See for example, Mitra (2011).
12Several commonly used utility functions satisfy this condition. For example, the iso-elastic function u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ
for σ > 0, satisfies this property.
7same utility function u, we restrict attention to voting decision rules which are symmetric across
n, i.e., vn = v for every n.
It is clear that voter i in In(k) only cares about the transfer to him, namely, xnk(j) for j = A,B. In
other words, he does not explicitly care about xn(j) for any n other than his own district. In this
spirit, we stipulate that the information available to voter i in In(k) pertains only to district n, i.e.,
he is informed of xn(A), xn(B), RAn and R
B
n .
The timing of the game is as follows.13 First, the party leaders of A and B simultaneously choose
the district level allocations {RAn , RBn }Nn=1. The allocations RAn and RBn are revealed to the fielded
candidates in district n, for each n ∈ {1, ..., N}. Next, in each district, the fielded candidates
concurrently announce their within-district allocations xn(j) for j = A,B while respecting the
corresponding district-level allocations RAn and R
B
n . Finally, each voter then draws his bias from
Fi (note, Fi is public information but each individual’s realization is observed by the individual
alone) and then votes for the party who promises him higher utility. The candidate with the highest
number of votes is declared the winner in the district; subsequently, the winner’s proposed platform
is implemented. Note, there is full-commitment from each party’s (and candidates’) side in keeping
with the Downsian tradition.
2.2. Equilibrium. We use the standard notion of subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept
for this game. To be specific, an equilibrium of this game is given by a collection of inter-district
and intra-district allocations, {Rjn; (xn1 (j), ..., xnK(j))}Nn=1 for j = A,B which are budget balanced
and feasible, respectively and a voting decision rule v all of which together satisfy the following:
(i) The voting decision rule v is a best-response to the intra-district allocations, {(xn1 (j), ..., xnK(j))}
for j = A,B and for every n.
(ii) The intra-district allocations {xn(A),xn(B)} constitute mutual best-responses for the fielded
candidates in every n given the allocations {RAn , RBn } and the voting decision rule v.
(iii) The allocations {RAn , RBn }Nn=1 constitute mutual best-responses for the party leaders of A and
B, given the intra-district allocations {xn(A),xn(B)}Nn=1 by the candidates and the voting deci-
sion rule v.
Existence: We now specify a sufficient (and by no means necessary) condition for the existence of
equilibrium in this game. The condition — adapted from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) — is the
following:
sup
|f ′i(x)|
fi(x)
≤ inf |u
′′(y)|
(u′(y))2
for every i ∈ ⋃n In. This essentially puts a threshold on the minimum degree of concavity of u
and ensures that the objective functions (of the maximization problems) are concave.14
Characterization: We now proceed to describe the set of equlibria for this simple game. Given the
equilibrium notion adopted, we start by solving backwards.
13Depending upon our choice of the parties’ payoff structure, we have two different games. It turns out that the results
we obtain for both games are substantially similar. For the ease of exposition, we continue to use the singular term
“game” than make the distinction.
14Many combinations of commonly used utility and density functions satisfy this requirement. For e.g., iso-elastic
utility functions u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ for σ ≥ 1 and the logistic distribution.
8We first outline the optimal voting decision rule. Consider voter i ∈ In(k), i.e, an individual in
group k in district n. Note, i′s payoff is u(yi + xnk(A)) + ai when party A
′s candidate wins and
u(yi + x
n
k(B)) when party B
′s candidate wins. Recall, ai is the net ideological bias voter i has
towards party A. Given that there is full commitment on the parties and candidates’ side, voter
i will simply vote for the party promising the higher payoff. Hence, in any (subgame perfect)
equilibrium of this game, every individual votes for the party offering the higher payoff; we will
call this voting decision rule v.
Next, we turn to the within-district allocation problem faced by the fielded candidates in any district
n. The candidates takeRAn , R
B
n and the voting rule v as given while choosing their respective intra-
district across-group allocations xn(A) and xn(B). Now, according to v, any individual i ∈ In(k)
votes for A when u(yi + xnk(A)) + ai > u(yi + x
n
k(B)); otherwise he votes for B.
15
Note, the probability that individual i votes for B is given by Fi(u(yi + xnk(B))− u(yi + xnk(A))).
Hence, the probability that i votes for A ≡ pi = 1− Fi(u(yi + xnk(B))− u(yi + xnk(A))).
Let di ≡ u(yi + xnk(B)) − u(yi + xnk(A)). So di is actually i′s utility difference arising from the
difference betweenA′s andB′s proposed transfers. This is what is traded off against i′s ideological
bias for the two parties in determining which party he votes for. We can re-write pi as 1− Fi(di).
Note,A′s candidate in district n faces the following problem: choose the intra-district across-group
allocations xn(A) permissible under the allocated budget RAn which will maximize his vote share
given B’s corresponding choice of xn(B).
Formally,
maxxn(A)
∑
i∈In
pi
subject to
K∑
k=1
mnk .x
n
k(A) ≤ RAn .
The problem for B′s candidate is analogous given that this stage game is constant–sum.
The necessary first-order conditions corresponding to every group k — for A′s and B′s candidates,
respectively — are given by:
(1)
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(A))fi(di) = λn.m
n
k
and
(2)
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(B))fi(di) = µn.m
n
k
where λn, µn > 0 are the associated lagrange multipliers.16 This implies
(3)
∑
i∈In(k) u
′(yi + xnk(A))fi(di)∑
i∈In(k) u
′(yi + xnk(B))fi(di)
=
λn
µn
≡ ρn
15Given that the bias distribution for every voter i is assumed to be without any mass points, the probability of indif-
ference for i is 0.
16It is clear that in our setup
∑K
k=1m
n
k .x
n
k (A) = R
A
n and
∑K
k=1m
n
k .x
n
k (B) = R
B
n .
9for every k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
As regards RAn and R
B
n , there are three possibilities: (i) R
A
n = R
B
n , (ii) R
A
n < R
B
n or (iii) R
A
n > R
B
n .
Of course, which of these will transpire in equilibrium — for any district n — will be determined
by the parties’ choice in the first stage of the game. But the fielded candidates simply take RAn and
RBn as given when choosing their respective within–district across–group allocations.
The following lemma explicitly deals with case (i).
LEMMA 1. Suppose that in equilibrium RAn = RBn for some district n. Then it must be that the
proposed intra-district allocation in n is identical for both parties, i.e., xn(A) = xn(B).
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, we look at case (ii) where the budgetary allocation by party A for district n is lower than that
of prty B′s. Here it must be that for some group k, we have xnk(A) < x
n
k(B). This immediately
implies — by Equation (3) — that ρn > 1 and hence xnk(A) < x
n
k(B) for every k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
Hence, di > 0 for every i in district n. In other words, every individual in this district gets promised
a higher transfer from party B as compared to A.
An analogous argument applies to case (iii) where RAn > R
B
n ; here ρn < 1 and di < 0 for every i
in district n.
So the probability that district n elects party A′ candidate — call it Pn— is given by
Pn ≡
∑
i∈In
pi =
∑
i∈In
[1− Fi(di)].
Now we return to the first stage of this game and focus on the problem faced by the two parties.
As mentioned earlier, the parties may be imputed either of the two objectives:
(I) Each party seeks to maximize the probability of winning a majority of the N districts.
(II) Each party seeks to maximize the expected plurality across all the districts taken together;
hence, maximize the number of votes recieved at the national level.
It turns out that the results we obtain are substantially similar under either of the two cases. We
start with case (I).
Define zn = 1 if district n elect’s party A′s candidate and 0 otherwise. Hence, the probability that
party A will win a majority (call it piA) is given by
piA = Prob.(
N∑
n=1
zn > N/2).
Therefore, the probability that party B wins a majority — call it piB — is simply 1− piA.
Recall, that piA and piB depend upon the chosen {RAn , RBn }Nn=1. Focus on any district n; party A′s
payoff can be thought of as follows:
piA = Prob.(
∑
d6=n
zd > N/2) + Prob.(
∑
d 6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2).Pn
10
The first term captures the probability that the outcome at the national level does not depend upon
the election outcome in district n. The second term denotes the case when party A just achieves
a majority and district n is part of it (hence the term Pn). Notice that the expression for piA above
has only one term which depends upon (RAn , R
B
n ) — namely, Pn.
17
Party A′s problem is therefore
max{RAn }Nn=1Prob.(
∑
d6=n
zd > N/2) + Prob.(
∑
d 6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2).Pn
subject to
N∑
n=1
RAn = 0.
Party B′s problem is analogous.
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium choices of RAn and R
B
n .
LEMMA 2. Suppose each party seeks to maximize the probability of winning a majority of the N
districts. For any district n ∈ {1, ..., N}, it must be that RAn = RBn .
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we conclude that in every district n, it must be that
RAn = R
B
n
and
xn(A) = xn(B).
Note, this implies the following relation which we will utilize later repeatedly:
(4)
1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk)fi(0) = λ
in for every k and for every n, in equilibrium.
LEMMA 3. Suppose each party seeks to maximize the probability of winning a majority of the N
districts. xn(A) = xn(B) ≡ xn for any district n implies that xn — and thereby RAn = RBn ≡ Rn
— is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we come to Case (II) where we assume that each party seeks to maximize the expected
plurality across all the districts taken together; hence, maximize the number of votes recieved at
the national level.
Here, Party A′s problem is
max{RAn }Nn=1
N∑
n=1
Pn
17We can write piA in this manner since we assume that the ideology shocks (ai) are drawn indepedently by the
individual voters.
11
subject to
N∑
n=1
RAn = 0.
Party B′s problem is to minimize the same objective function with an analogous constraint.
It is quite straightforward to see that essentially partyAwill allocate {RAn }Nn=1 so as to equalize ∂Pn∂RAn
across all the N districts; party B will behave analogously. This will basically lead us to Equation
(9); from where we can deduce — like in Case (1) — that RAn = R
B
n and x
n(A) = xn(B) in every
district n. Equation (4) will naturally follow.
The discussion above is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. There is a unique equilibrium of this game. In this unique equilibrium, both
the parties and their respective candidates behave in a symmetric fashion, i.e, RAn = R
B
n and
xn(A) = xn(B) in every district n.
This completes our description of the equilibrium of this simple game and sets the ground for our
main results.
2.3. Electoral competition and Income distribution. There are basically three sets of (related)
questions which we investigate here. They are: (i) Which type of districts typically receive more
aggregate transfers, i.e., higher RAn = R
B
n ≡ Rn? (ii) Given Rn, which groups — within district
n — gain the most? (iii) Finally, what is the effect on income inequality as electoral competition
increases?
We have assumed that all districts have the same population and the latter are partitioned into K
disjoint groups. However, we have imposed no restrictions on the wealth levels across districts: in
the context of our model, this means the terms mnk are allowed to vary across n. So some districts
are poor while others are rich. There is another dimension along which districts may exhibit
heterogeniety, namely, in the distribution of ideological bias among the voters: some districts may
have large sections of the population who are partisan while some may have many voters who
are ideologically detached from both parties. Hence, the word “type” in question (i) above may
be interpreted in two ways: one, is in terms of income distribution while the other is in terms of
ideology distribution.18
Let us start with the simple case where every individual draws his ideological bias from the same
distribution — i.e., Fi = F for every i ∈
⋃
n In. Here, clearly, every district is identical in terms
of the distribution in ideology; so by “type” of a district, we mean the income dsitribution therein.
In light of question (i) above, we make two observations.
OBSERVATION 1. Suppose all districts are identical in terms of income distribution apart from
being homogeneous in ideology distribution as defined above. Then it must be that Rn = 0 for
every n, in equilibrium. In other words, there is no redistribution across the different districts.
Proof. See Appendix.
18Of course, income levels and ideology distribution may be correlated in a certain manner; in which case “type” will
encompass both entities simultaneously. In the model presented here, we treat these as independent. We do discuss
the ramifications of possible correlations between income levels and ideology distribution in the section 2.4
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Observation 1 tells us that when all districts look identical there can be no asymmetry in the
district-level allocation in equilibrium; in other words, all districts are treated equally in terms of
aggregate transfers.
Take any district n. We will say that this district becomes “poorer” if the following applies: some
individuals belonging to some groups (within n) experience a reduction in their incomes. Hence,
some people simply become poorer. More formally, let y denote the income distribution of In
initially and let y′ denote the same afterwards. We say n has become poorer — in the shift from y
to y′ — if y′i ≤ yi for every i ∈ In with the inequality strict for at least one i.
OBSERVATION 2. Impose homogeneity in ideology distribution as defined above. Then, the poorer
a district — ceteris paribus — the higher the aggregate transfer it receives in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Observation 2 tells us that ceteris paribus the poorer a district, the more transfers it receives.
In a way, there is a trend towards equalization of incomes across districts given the assumption
of homogeneity in ideology distribution. Now, we relax this assumption to a certain degree —
henceforth, we allow for ideology distribution to vary across districts but require that it be the
same for all voters within a district. Specifically,
Fi = F
n
for all i ∈ In and for each n ∈ {1, ..., N}. Thus, we now allow for heterogeniety across districts
in terms of ideology distribution. We can re-examine question (i) posed above, in this context.
In a manner analogous to Observation 2 above, we can compare districts which are similar in all
respects but in ideology distribution.
In keeping with the previous literature19, we interpret the density of the ideological bias evaluated
at 0 (the cut–point, so to speak) to be an index of how swing or non-partisan the district happens
to be. To see this in a more intuitive sense, consider density functions which are symmetric and
unimodal. Now consider two districts s and t where f s(0) > f t(0). This is roughly equivalent to
saying that s, in relation to t, has a higher proportion of citizens who are ideologically equidistant
(or detached) from either party. Thus, s is more swing than t and so the former can be more
unpredictable in terms of election results.
The preceding discussion suggests that competition should be tighter in s as compared to t. This,
in turn, leads to s being more favored — in terms of aggregate transfers — by the competing
parties than t. In fact, in line with the findings of the previous literature, this is what is stated in the
observation below.
OBSERVATION 3. Suppose that the ideology distribution varies across districts but is the same for
all voters within a district. Then, the more “swing” a district — ceteris paribus — the higher the
aggregate transfer it receives in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
This brings us to the next question, i.e., question (ii), which tries to identify the gainers and losers
— in terms of the group-wise allocations — within a district.
19For instance, see Arulampalam et al (2009).
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OBSERVATION 4. Suppose that the ideology distribution varies across districts but is the same
for all voters within a district. Then, the poorer the group, the higher the transfer they obtain in
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we are equipped to confront question (iii): what is the effect on income inequality in a dis-
trict as it becomes more “swing”, i.e., electoral competition therein increases? We will utilize
Observations 3 and 4 to guide our intuition.
Recall, Observation 3 states that the more “swing” a district, the more aggregate transfers it gets
in equilibrium. Observation 4 relates to the distribution of benefits across the K groups given a
fixed level of transfer at the district level. Hence, it is not obvious as to what happens to income
inequality — within a district — as the aggregate transfer increases owing to an increase in elec-
toral competition in that district. There are various measures of income inequality in the literature
several of which use Lorenz-ordering as a precept.20 Here, we do not pick any particular mea-
sure(s) but refer to “equalization of incomes” in the following sense. We have the utility function
u defined over income. Recall, that u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0. Take two income levels y1 and
y2, where 0 < y1 < y2; further, suppose these are the only income levels in the economy with the
population evenly split by these two income levels.
Clearly, the “difference” between y1 and y2 is crucial in determing the extent of inequality, where
by “difference” one could mean y2 − y1, 1− y1y2 or many other such terms. For us, “difference” is
in the sense of the (absolute) difference in marginal utilities, i.e., u′(y2) − u′(y1). Note, given the
rather standard assumptions on u, this way of defining “difference” is closely connected to either
y2−y1 or 1− y1y2 . Hence, our usage of “equalization of incomes” is to be interpreted as convergence
in the marginal utilities.
The following proposition informs us that the more “swing” a district, the greater the drive towards
equalization of incomes in that district.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the ideology distribution varies across districts but is the same for
all voters within a district. Then, the more “swing” a district — ceteris paribus — the greater the
tendency towards equalization of incomes in that district.
Proof. See Appendix.
The basic idea behind Proposition 2 is simple: the intuition is partly similar to the idea of a mean–
preserving increase in spread. The mean of the marginal utilities — the u′(.)’s — for every group
k is equalized across all K groups in both districts s and t (hence, the analogy with the mean–
preserving part). However, the within–group spread in u′ is lower in the more swing district,
namely, s (hence, the analogy with the increase in spread part).
2.4. A Possible Extension. There are several ways to extend this simple model. Here we discuss
one possibility, namely, where the ideology distribution is allowed to vary across theK groups even
within a district n. So one may think of the individual i′s bias draw ai as having two (additive)
20Foster (1985) offers a comprehensive summary; see also Sen (1997).
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independent components — one which is district-specific (an) and one which is group-specific
(ak). So that one could think of ai as ai ≡ an + ak where an is drawn from some distribution Fn
and is independent of the distribution from which ak is drawn; call the latter distribution Fk.
Note, the probability that voter i votes for party A — denoted by pi — would depend on both Fn
and Fk. Clearly, this complicates the analysis to some extent. We do not pursue it here because
of the following reason: we are interested in the effect district–level electoral competition has
on district–level overall inequality (encompassing within– group and across– group inequality).
Hence, variations in the across– district ideology shock suffices for our purpose; the group-specific
shock introduces another channel of heterogeniety which although plausible does not really address
our questions. Morever, we conjecture that the main intuition will survive even in this (extended)
framework.
The main empirically testable prediction that our model generates is stated in Proposition 2. We
now turn to our findings with regard to data from India.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Data. We need to combine data on incomes with the data on election outcomes. In the case
of India, nationally representative data on personal incomes is hard to obtain since a vast majority
of Indian households (primarily residing in rural parts) are exempt from payment of income taxes
(see Banerjee and Pikkety (2003)). However, there is data on consumer expenditure in India which
is publicly available; thus consumer expenditure serves as an excellent proxy for income in our
analysis. These data are collected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) .
The National Sample Survey (NSS) is a large-scale consumer expenditure survey which is con-
ducted quinquennially and covers the entire nation; the unit of observation is a household. The
recall period used is 30 days, i.e., the surveyed households are asked to provide information on
consumption expenditure incurred over the past 30 days. For the current study we use the 43rd
and 61st rounds of the NSS. The 43rd round was conducted during July 1987 – June 1988 and
the 61st round was conducted during July 2004 – June 2005. Alongside information on consumer
expenditure, the survey also collects data on other socio-economic characteristics of the (surveyed)
households such as religion, caste, education, etc.
This information on household expenditure is combined with election data obtained from the Elec-
tion Commission of India. We use the data for the parliamentary (or federal level) elections from
1977 to 2004. During this period, 11 such general elections took place in India. Our theory re-
quires us to use some measure of the electoral competitiveness of the district — the “swing” nature,
so to speak. We primarily utilize the difference in percentage vote shares of the two parties that
obtain the highest number of votes in any constituency. This is in line with Arulampalam et al
(2009). We use the winning margin and the vote share of the winning party in the election prior
to each expenditure round — in turn to capture the extent of electoral competition in the district.
As an additional check, we also use an average of the margin and vote share (respectively) — each
averaged over the 3–4 elections — prior to the corresponding expenditure round.
The Indian National Congress party is one of the most prominent national parties in India (es-
tablished in 1885) and is closely associated with the Indian freedom struggle. We also use the
information about whether the constituency had a shift away from or to a Member of Parliament
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FIGURE 1. Map of the Indian districts. Notes: The 179 districts in our sample
are shaded dark grey (denoted by 1). The rest of the districts in light grey (denoted
by 0) nest multiple constituencies and hence are not in our sample.
(MP) from the Indian National Congress party. The use of a more refined measure of swing which
takes into account movements to and from different parties is not possible for the following rea-
son. There has been an immense proliferation of political parties at both the state and central
levels, most of it arising from the splitting up of the main existing national or even regional parties.
Moreover, various coalitions — ad hoc and otherwise — became popular from the 1980s onward.
This makes it very difficult to say whether there really has been an effective shift of regime when
say person X wins the same seat first as a candidate of party L and then as a candidate of party R.
Given the way the nature of politics and political parties evolved during this period, we chose to
proceed with a rather conservative division of parties into “Congress” and “Non-Congress” camps
and recorded the movements of a district between these camps over the different election periods.
A brief word about the Indian political system is in order. The Indian Parliament is bicameral in
nature. However, the Lok Sabha is the popularly elected House and is de facto more powerful
than the other House (Rajya Sabha). The popularly elected Members of Parliament (MP) enjoy
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a five-year term after which fresh Lok Sabha elections are held. There were 518 (Lok Sabha)
constituencies in 1971. This went up to 542 after a Delimitation order in 1976 and then to 543 in
1991.
Population is the basis of allocation of seats of the Lok Sabha. As far as possible, every state
gets representation in the Lok Sabha in proportion to its population as per census figures. Hence,
larger and more populous states have more seats in the Lok Sabha as compared to their smaller and
sparsely-populated counterparts. For example, Uttar Pradesh (a north Indian state) with a popula-
tion of over 166 million has 80 Lok Sabha seats while the state of Nagaland with a population of
less than 2 million has only one Lok Sabha seat.
The NSSO expenditure rounds allow identification of the sureveyed household upto the district
to which it belongs; no finer identification is possible. However, it is often the case that a single
district houses more than one electoral constituency; this is especially true for more populous dis-
tricts. Given the nature of our hypotheses, we have to restrict attention to only single-constituency
districts, i.e. to those places where a district corresponds to just one single constituency 21. In
our sample, there are 179 such districts which we follow for two time periods. These NSS ‘thick’
round surveys are representative at the district level.22
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the districts in India. The 179 districts in our sample
are spread all over the country.
Tables 1 and 2 provide the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Comparing the
election data across the two periods, we see that elections clearly became more competitive over
the years. For instance, in the elections prior to 1988, the average winning margin varied between
4% and 51%. On the other hand, in the elections between 1988 and 2004 the same statistic was
never higher than 31% for any constituency. A similar observation applies to the vote share of the
winning candidate.
Between the two periods, both poverty and inequality have fallen on average across the districts
suggestive of a trend towards a secular balanced growth. Notably, polarization as measured by
the Foster-Wolfson index23 registers a decline – on average – when comparing across the two
periods; this is suggestive of the growth of the “middle class” over time. Altogether, these tables
clearly indicate that there was a lot of dynamism both on the income distribution frontier and in
the political scene in India during the period of our study.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a simple yet compelling visual representation of the empirical patterns
which we subsequently reinstate with our empirical specifications. In each of the figures we pro-
vide a basic scatterplot where we pool the observations over the two rounds. The gini coefficients
corresponding to the 358 observations are plotted on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis plots
21 In a district with several constituencies, the link between electoral competitivess and polarization (or inequality)
cannot be clearly established. For example, any change in polarization (or inequality) in any one of the constituencies
(presumably as a response to electoral competition in that constituency) does not necessarily reflect a similar change
in polarization (or inequality) in the district overall.
22Several authors have used these NSS data at the district level. See, e.g., Topalova (2010), Edmonds et al (2010),
Cutler et al (2010), Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009) and Chattopadhyay (2010) among others.
23The measure of polarization posited by Foster and Wolfson (1992, 2010) is well–disposed towards capturing the
size of the middle class. Hence, this is the measure we use in the empirical analysis.
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Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Vote share of winner 54.347 8.299 35.910 81.080
Winning margin 22.055 14.025 0.030 64.080
Swing Congress 0.240 0.428 0.000 1.000
Congress’s vote share 51.791 11.673 0.000 79.660
Average winning margin 23.587 8.837 3.930 51.370
Average vote share of winner 55.356 5.126 41.907 74.405
Average Congress vote share 42.659 10.295 0.000 65.180
Per capita monthly expenditure 190.047 51.251 89.037 350.526
Literacy rate 42.120 14.360 14.077 90.848
Population 0.199 0.078 0.042 0.408
Rural population (percentage) 80.662 14.001 21.622 100.000
Headcount poverty rate 36.620 18.477 2.760 90.818
Poverty gap ratio 9.346 6.515 0.276 38.366
Gini Coefficient 30.038 5.065 15.816 47.209
Hindu population (percentage) 84.448 18.017 0.779 100.000
SC population (percentage) 18.620 9.608 0.185 55.304
Inter–Quartile Range (mean–normalized) 0.531 0.083 0.272 0.810
Foster–Wolfson index of Polarization 0.127 0.025 0.057 0.209
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics (1987-88). Notes: The information on electoral out-
comes is from the Election Commission of India statistical reports. The national elections
were held in 1977, 1980 and 1984-85. The data on the consumer expenditure and other
demographic characteristics comes from the NSS 43rd round which was conducted during
1987-88.
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Vote share of winner 48.794 8.189 26.540 69.830
Winning margin 11.270 8.970 0.190 40.660
Swing Congress 0.291 0.455 0.000 1.000
Congress’s vote share 33.282 17.277 0.000 65.340
Average winning margin 11.433 5.820 2.573 30.433
Average vote share of winner 46.211 6.183 29.837 62.823
Average Congress vote share 31.750 14.034 2.065 56.750
Per capita monthly expenditure 670.780 236.418 346.695 1,780.682
Literacy rate 59.320 13.699 27.629 96.826
Population 0.207 0.103 0.050 0.605
Rural population (percentage) 80.252 15.320 17.741 97.753
Headcount poverty rate 22.907 16.903 0.000 65.109
Poverty gap ratio 4.262 3.916 0.000 18.386
Gini Coefficient 26.164 5.801 13.021 44.044
Hindu population (percentage) 83.947 19.754 0.174 100.000
SC population (percentage) 19.610 11.404 0.000 65.176
Inter–Quartile Range (mean–normalized) 0.483 0.121 0.241 1.003
Foster–Wolfson index of Polarization 0.122 0.034 0.053 0.243
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics (2004-05). Notes: The information on electoral out-
comes is from the Election Commission of India statistical reports. The national elections
were held in 1991-92, 1996, 1998 and 1999. The data on the consumer expenditure and
other demographic characteristics is from the NSS 61st round which was conducted during
2004-05.
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FIGURE 2. Scatterplot of Gini and Margin. Notes: The gini coefficients cor-
responding to the 179 districts are pooled over the two rounds and plotted on the
vertical axis. The horizontal axis plots the corresponding winning margins. A linear
fit is also plotted which is clearly upward–sloping.
the corresponding winning margin in Figure 2 and winner’s voteshare in Figure 3. The upward–
sloping linear fit in each of the two figures provides a basic sense of the association between the
variables.
We now move on to the details of our empirical strategy for the identification of the relevant
parameters.
3.2. Empirical Specification. Our data provides a two-period panel spanning 1987-88 and 2004-
05. We use a linear fixed effects specification for the empirical exercise. Specifically, for every
district d in time period t, we have :
ydt = αd + γt + βXdt + ρZdt + dt
where ydt is a measure of inequality or polarization, Xdt includes a vector of variables describing
the political climate in the district, (like winning margin, average margin in the last 3-4 elections,
winner’s vote share, etc.). Zdt is the set of demographic and geographic controls such as the
population share of the district, percentage of Hindus in the district, literacy rates and average
monthly per capita expenditure for the district. αd represents the district fixed effects while γt
captures the time effect. Also, dt is the error term in this panel specification.
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FIGURE 3. Scatterplot of Gini and Vote share of the winner. Notes: The gini
coefficients corresponding to the 179 districts are pooled over the two rounds and
plotted on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis plots the corresponding winner’s
voteshare. A linear fit is also plotted which is clearly upward–sloping.
The primary results are collected below.
3.3. Results. We first turn to the relationship between electoral uncertainty and inequality in in-
come (in our case, proxied by consumer expenditure). As discussed above, we construct several
measures to capture the extent of political competition in a district. The primary proxy for elec-
toral uncertainty exploits the difference in percentage vote shares of the two parties that obtain the
highest number of votes in any constituency. This is in the spirit of Arulampalam et al (2009).
We use (i) the winning margin and (ii) the vote share of the winning party in the election prior to
each corresponding expenditure round — in turn — to capture the extent of electoral competition
in the district. The average margin in the previous 3 to 4 general elections is used as an alternative
variable to describe how closely the elections have been in a district. The average vote share of
the winner is also used as a measure of electoral competition. Clearly, the higher the percentage of
votes obtained by the winner on average, the lower the degree of electoral competitiveness in the
district.
3.3.1. Main results. Table 3 gives the results for our benchmark case. Here we report the effect
of winning margin and (separately) the effect of the winner’s vote share on the gini coefficent.
We find that an increase in the political competition —either by a fall in the margin of victory or
winner’s vote share — is associated with lower inequality.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Winning margin 0.054** 0.038 0.049*
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
Vote share of winner 0.091*** 0.069* 0.076**
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Population 0.890 1.701 1.242 2.021
(5.310) (5.084) (5.354) (5.099)
Rural population (percentage) -0.161*** -0.129** -0.160*** -0.131***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050)
Hindu Population (percentage) 0.014 0.012
(0.053) (0.054)
SC population (percentage) -0.062 -0.060
(0.049) (0.049)
ST population (percentage) -0.187*** -0.181***
(0.069) (0.069)
Headcount poverty rate 0.040* 0.039*
(0.023) (0.022)
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.341 0.378 0.307 0.344 0.378
TABLE 3. Linear panel regression. Notes: Dependent variable is the Gini coeffi-
cient. Winning margin= difference in percentage vote shares of the two top parties.
Vote share of the winner is expressed in percentage terms. All regressions contain
district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by district
in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%.
Columns (1) and (4) represent the relationship devoid of any controls (district–specific effects
and time dummies are present always). The patterns are robust to the inclusion of controls like
population shares of different castes/tribes, religious groups and the poverty levels in the district
as can be seen from the remaining columns of Table 3.
Next, we turn to the relationship between electoral uncertainty and income polarization. Here we
use the Foster-Wolfson index of polarization as our measure of the (inverse of the) middle class.
Columns (1) — (3) in Table 4 shows that polarization is also higher when there is lesser political
competition as measured by the winning margin. Recall, this is essentially saying that greater
political competetion in a district is positively associated with a larger middle class in the district.
Additionally, we use the inter-quartile range — normalized by the mean —- as a proxy for the
level of inequality and also for the size of the middle class. Even then we see that a higher winning
margin results in greater difference between the two income quartiles thus normalized; see columns
(4) — (6) in Table 4.
3.3.2. Robustness checks. We subject our basic findings to a multitude of robustness checks.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Winning margin 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population 0.365 0.385 -0.128 -0.111
(0.313) (0.305) (0.270) (0.263)
Rural population (percentage) -0.006** -0.005* -0.005** -0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Hindu Population (percentage) -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
SC population (percentage) -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
ST population (percentage) -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Headcount poverty rate 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.095 0.120 0.172 0.195 0.206
TABLE 4. Linear panel regression. Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) —
(3) is the Foster–Wolfson Polarization measure; in columns (4) — (6) the dependent
variable is the Inter-Quartile Range (normalized by the mean). Winning margin=
difference in percentage vote shares of the two top parties. All regressions contain
district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by district
in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%.
First, we report some results obtained with some alternative measures of income dispersion. Specif-
ically, we considered Generalized Entropy measures (The Mean Log Deviation and the Theil in-
dex), the Atkinson index (for parameter values 0.5, 1 and 2) and the Decile Dispersion Ratio (top
10% by bottom 10%). By and large, the results we obtain with these alternative measures resonate
with our original findings. We report some regressions in Table 5.24
Next we introduce some alternative measures of electoral competition and check for the persistence
of our main findings.
Rather than using the margin and vote share of winner from the election prior to each correspond-
ing expenditure survey round, one could also use the average values for the proxies of electoral
competition in the previous 3—4 elections. We do so and our results are similar to the earlier ones;
we report some such regressions in Table 6.
24Here we report the specifications with the full set of controls. In the regressions with varying subsets of controls, the
results are very similar. Hence, we do not report them.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Winning Margin 0.000* 0.000* 0.011**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Voteshare of winner 0.001* 0.001* 0.015**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Population 0.061 0.064 0.047 0.050 0.602 0.661
(0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.041) (0.967) (0.958)
Rural Population (percentage) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
Hindu Population (percentage) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010)
SC Population (percentage) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
ST Population (percentage) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.017* -0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Headcount poverty rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.348 0.355 0.357 0.242 0.240
TABLE 5. Linear panel regressions (Alternative measures of inequality and polar-
ization). Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the Mean Log Devi-
ation, in columns (3) and (4) is the Atkinson index (parameter value 1), in columns
(5) and (6) is the Decile Dispersion Ratio (top 10% by bottom 10%). All regressions
contain district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by
district in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at
1%.
Columns (1) — (3) Table 6, correspond to the first three columns in Table 3; columns (4) — (6) in
Table 6 correspond to the remaining three columns in Table 3. The realtionship observed in each
of these specifications are similar to those in Table 3.
Another way to capture the idea of a swing district would be the following. One could possibly
identify whenever there is a change in the political party which wins the election in the district.
However in 1977 (the first election year we look at) there were only 20 recognized political parties
which contested the elections. By 1999 the number of recognized political parties had risen to 47.
This significant rise in the number of political parties was not merely a case of greater participation
of the general populace in the political domain — it was more the case that several political parties
were created by the splintering of existing politcal parties. Therefore, for the time horizon we
consider, we are unable to track whether there was a swing away from a particular political party
or that merely a segment of the old party came back into power.
The only political party which has remained relatively “stable”, in the sense of somewhat main-
taining its core identity, is the Indian National Congress. Given the way the nature of politics and
political parties evolved during this period, we chose to proceed with a rather conservative division
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Average winning margin 0.114*** 0.099** 0.104**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
Average vote share of the winner 0.138** 0.122** 0.120**
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060)
Population -0.503 0.139 -0.194 0.497
(5.247) (4.995) (5.281) (5.001)
Rural population (percentage) -0.157*** -0.129*** -0.162*** -0.135***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
Hindu population (percentage) 0.009 0.006
(0.053) (0.053)
SC population (percentage) -0.056 -0.055
(0.045) (0.047)
ST population (percentage) -0.177*** -0.171**
(0.067) (0.068)
Headcount poverty rate 0.041* 0.039*
(0.023) (0.023)
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.356 0.390 0.311 0.351 0.382
TABLE 6. Linear panel regression. Notes: Dependent variable is the Gini coef-
ficient. Average winning margin is constructed using data from the previous 3–4
general elections. Average vote share of the winner is the winner’s vote share in
percentage terms averaged over the previous 3–4 general elections. All regressions
contain district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by
district in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at
1%.
of parties into “Congress” and “Non–Congress” camps and recorded the movements of a district
between these camps over the different election periods.
As our additional measure of political regime change, we use whether or not the district moved
away from/towards a Congress MP. We create a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there
was a change to or from a Congress MP in the district for the election prior to the corresponding
expenditure round, and 0 otherwise. Note, the swing congress variable is a very crude measure of
the district’s electoral volatility and it exhibits much less variation vis-a-vis our other measures of
electoral competition.
Table 7 contains some of the results using this Swing Congress variable. Columns (1) — (3) have
the gini coefficent as the dependent variable. Note, that the Swing Congress variable exhibits a
negative effect on the degree of inequality in the district as captured by the gini coefficent; this is
substantively similar to our previous results which used other measures of electoral uncertainty.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Swing Congress -2.073*** -1.721*** -1.587** -0.075** -0.063* -0.057*
(0.689) (0.668) (0.669) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Population proportion 1.577 2.224 0.384 0.394
(5.334) (5.034) (0.313) (0.305)
Rural population (percentage) -0.156*** -0.135*** -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.002) (0.003)
Hindu population (percentage) 0.029 -0.003
(0.054) (0.003)
SC population (percentage) -0.060 -0.001
(0.048) (0.003)
ST population (percentage) -0.171** -0.003
(0.070) (0.003)
Headcount poverty rate 0.035 0.002
(0.023) (0.001)
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
Adjusted R2 0.321 0.355 0.384 0.057 0.092 0.106
TABLE 7. Linear panel regression. Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) —
(3) is the Gini coefficient; in columns (4) — (6) the dependent variable is the Foster–
Wolfson Polarization measure. Swing Congress is a dummy variable which equals
1 if there was a change to or from a Congress MP in the district for the election prior
to the corresponding expenditure round, and 0 otherwise. All regressions contain
district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by district
in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%.
Columns (4) — (6) in Table 7 have the Foster–Wolfson index of polarization as the dependent
variable. These columns reveal a strong negative relationship between Swing Congress and polar-
ization in accordance with our previous findings. This effect is robust to the inclusion of several
controls; see columns (5) and (6). Therefore, these results re-iterate our basic findings.
The correlation between all the proxies of how ‘swing’ a district is provided in Table 11 (in the
“Appendix” section). As can be seen, the different proxies are somewhat correlated though the
amount varies for different pairs of variables. The variables for the two periods have been pooled
together; hence the number of observations is 358. The corresponding figures for each period are
also similar.
Our baseline results use two NSS rounds, namely the 43rd and the 61st. There is another round
which we could potentially use: the 55th round which was conducted in 1999–2000. However, in
the 55th round, for some consumption items the surveyed households were asked to report their
expenditure based on a 7-day recall period as opposed to the 30-day recall period used in the
earlier rounds. Several authors have argued that this change would lead to biased reporting by
the households. As a robustness check we do use the 55th round in addition to the 43rd and 61st
rounds. We use the election prior to 1999–2000 to construct the political competition variables for
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this round: so that is from the national election conducted in 1998. For the other two rounds, the
political competition variables are as before.
Our new results are substantially similar to the original ones. We report a selection in Table 10
(in the “Appendix” section). These essentially correspond to the regressions in our baseline tables
(Tables 3 and 4). However, we treat these results with caution given the debate over comparability
issues regarding the 55th round.
3.3.3. Concerns. We discuss two of the main concerns involving our empirical exercise. The first
one is endogeneity due to reverse causality. One could argue that the members of middle income
groups vote in a certain way so as to make the political contest close. The second is the issue of
migration as a result of political transfers/ public goods provision. We briefly discuss each issue
below.
Let us entertain the following hypothesis about voting behavior of individuals. Say, it is the case
that the more extreme the income group — either rich or poor — the greater ex ante bias for one or
the other of the two main parties. Hence, middle income voters are more ambivalent towards the
two competing parties.
Focus on a district populated by largely low income income groups and a few very rich income
groups; hence, we have a rather unequal income distribution in this district. Given the assumption
about voting behavior, this district is likely to have high margins of victory with the low income
voters (the majority) voting for one party and the rich (minority) voting for the other party. Contrast
this with a district with fairly low levels of income dispersion; say, most individuals fall in the
middle income category. Here, the margin of victory is likely to be small since the bulk of the
population is indifferent between the two parties.
In other words, one would see the same patterns we observe in the data with causation running the
other way — from income distribution to electoral competition.
Bardhan et al (2008) study political participation and targeting of public sevices in the Indian state
of West Bengal. In their words “...the difference in reported registration rates and turnouts were
modest, more similar to the European patterns rather than the steep asymmetries in the United
States. With regard to voting disturbances, there was no clear correlation with socio-economic
status.” They also find that attendance rates (in political meetings, such as rallies, election meetings
called by political parties) did not exhibit any marked unevenness across different land classes. So
this does not seem to pose a serious problem. Also, in all of the regressions presented so far, we
look at the effect of elections on subsequent polarization (and inequality) — so that there is enough
of a time lag with elections preceding the corresponding expenditure rounds.
As to the second concern — namely, migration as a response to political transfers/public goods
provision — we can take some comfort in the fact that migration rates in India are rather low in
comparison with other developing nations. In fact, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) explicitly state
that “Among developing countries, India stands out for its remarkably low levels of occupational
and spatial mobility.” They delve into the proximate causes behind this phenomenon and using a
unique panel dataset (identifying sub-caste (jati) membership) find that the existence of sub-caste
networks that provide mutual insurance to their members play a key role in restricting mobility.
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To further bolster our case against reverse causality and omitted variables, we turn to an instru-
mental variables approach which is described in detail below.
3.3.4. A 2-SLS IV approach. The basic idea is to use a variable which exhibits a high (partial)
correlation with our main variable of interest — namely, winning margin or Vote share of winner
— and has no independent effect on our dependent variable, i.e., the gini coefficient for the district.
We argue that the performance of any particular national party — in our case, the Indian National
Congress party (henceforth, INC) — is a good candidate as an instrument. Specifically, we em-
phasize that the vote share of INC in a district (at a particular election) has two properties: (i) it is
highly correlated with the amount of electoral competition in the district and (ii) by itself, this vari-
able does not have any effect on the income distribution in the district. All that INC’s performance
in the district can affect — in terms of district-level income distribution — is through the channel
of electoral competition. Moreover, in several of these districts INC is not the winner, which re-
inforces our argument that INC’s performance can have no direct effect on the district-level income
distribution.
There is no compelling reason to believe that the INC is necessary specially (dis)liked by any
particular income group(s). In fact, in principle, any national level political party’s vote share could
be used for this exercise. We pick the INC since it has been historically an important national level
party in India.
We use INC’s vote share in a district in the election prior to the expenditure round as an instrument
for our potentially endogenous variable of interest, i.e, Winning margin. We report some results
in Table 8. Columns (1) — (3) in Table 8 reveal that the effect of Winning margin on the gini
coefficient is positive and significant — just as we had before — when we instrument for it by
using INC’s vote share. We repeat the exercise for our alternative measure of electoral competition,
namely, the vote share of the winner. The results are substantively similar; see columns (4) — (6)
of Table 8.
We get similar results when we use the Foster–Wolfson index of polarization as the dependent vari-
able instead of the gini coefficient. Thus, the findings from our 2–SLS IV approach corroborates
with our previous results and points to the robustness of our findings.
A particularly critical reader may still question the 2–SLS results by arguing that the instrument is
possibly endogenous like the original variables of political competition; in other words, we have
an instrument which is imperfect.25 Nevo and Rosen (2012) offers an attractive approach towards
dealing with imperfect instrumental variables (IIV).26 They assume (i) the correlation between the
instrumental variable and the error term has the same sign as the correlation between the endoge-
nous regressor; (ii) and the error term and that the instrumental variable is less correlated with the
error term than is the endogenous regressor. Using these assumptions, they derive analytic bounds
for the parameters. Their approach is very much applicable to our case. Specifically, we are able
to generate one-sided bounds for our parameters of interest.27
25We do not face problems of having a weak instrument as our first stage F–statistics are quite sizeable.
26A recent paper using this approach is Aragon and Rud (2013).
27We follow Nevo and Rosen (2012) closely in the estimation procedure. In particular, Proposition 2 in their paper is
relevant to our case. By means of that proposition we are able to generate one-sided lower bounds for the coefficients
of interest.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Winning margin 0.220** 0.212** 0.249**
(0.100) (0.100) (0.109)
Vote share of winner 0.259** 0.249** 0.284**
(0.119) (0.119) (0.125)
Population 1.853 2.845 2.724 3.592
(6.386) (6.879) (5.911) (6.037)
Rural population (percentage) -0.106* -0.048 -0.127** -0.085
(0.060) (0.071) (0.052) (0.057)
Hindu population (percentage) -0.029 -0.025
(0.055) (0.055)
SC population (percentage) -0.058 -0.051
(0.053) (0.051)
ST population (percentage) -0.184** -0.165**
(0.073) (0.067)
First stage coefficient:
Congress party’s vote share 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.207***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
F–statistic 15.712 15.139 15.076 18.004 17.599 18.948
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358
TABLE 8. Linear panel: 2–SLS IV regressions. Notes: Dependent variable is the
Gini coefficient for all second–stage results reported in columns (1) — (6). Con-
gress party’s vote share is used an instrument for Winning margin in columns (1) —
(3), and for Vote share of winner in columns (4) — (6). The lower panel reports the
first stage coefficients and the corresponding F–statistics. All regressions contain
district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by district
in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%.
Table 9 lists some of our results from using the IIV estimation method. In every specification,
the coefficents on the variables winning margin and Vote share of the winner are estimated to be
within some intervals the lower bounds of which are strictly positive. In particular, columns 1 and
3 report the coefficient intervals where no controls are included in the linear panel specification.
Columns 2 and 4 report the same for the spefications with the full set of controls. In every column
we find that the coefficients on the political competition variables are positive and bounded away
from zero.
The results from using the Nevo and Rosen (2012) approach certainly serve to mitigate endogeneity
concerns regarding our 2–SLS IV estimation.
Taking stock of our entire empirical findings, we find that there is a strong relationship between the
degree of electoral competition in a district and the nature of redistribution pursued therein. More
specifically, we find that districts which have experienced tighter elections tend to evince lower
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
Winning margin [0.219,∞) [0.300,∞ )
(0.023,∞) (0.040,∞)
Vote share of the winner [0.259,∞) [0.330,∞)
(0.025,∞) (0.051,∞)
Estimation method IIV IIV IIV IIV
Controls No Yes, all No Yes, all
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 358 358 358 358
TABLE 9. Linear Panel: IIV estimation. Notes: The figures in parantheses give the
95% confidence interval of the estimated parameter intervals. For all regressions,
the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. We use the Nevo and Rosen (2012)
estimation procedure to produce the interval estmates for our potentially imperfect
instrumental variable, namely, the vote share of the Congress.
levels of inequality and polarization suggesting that the middle class thrives where political parties
are perceived to be relatively balanced in the eyes of the voters.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study how the extent of electoral competition affects the distribution of income
in society, particularly, the effect on income inequality and the growth of a middle income group.
We build a theory based on the intuition from standard probabilistic models. In our model, the
parties compete at two stages: (i) they allocate resources across the districts and (ii) then they
pander to different groups within a district. We show that an increase in electoral competition
leads to reduction in income disparities. The existing literature has stressed the role of political
competition in directing tranfers and have generally concluded that “swing” districts get more
targeted resources in the aggregate. To the best of our knowledge, no other work has looked at the
effect of increased political competition on the distribution of incomes in society.
We use data from the Indian parliamentary elections which are combined with household-level
consumption expenditure data rounds from NSSO (1987-88 and 2004-05) to yield a panel of Indian
districts. India has had a vibrant democracy since the nation’s independence in 1947. Although
there have been several political parties since the 1950s, the national elections had been by and
large dominated by the Indian National Congress (INC) party. However, since the 1980s there
have been a tremendous proliferation of political parties both at the state and the national levels.
In fact, 1977 was witness to a non-Congress led government at the centre for the first time since
India’s independence. Although the INC continues to be a major player in national elections till
this day, it no longer enjoys the kind of monopoly it did prior to the mid-1960s. Moreover, a
majority of elections in the 1990s resulted in “hung Parliaments” meaning that no single party
obtained a clear majority of seats and thus began the era of coalitional politics in India. Our period
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of study corresponds to the time after the INC had lost its quasi-monopoly in the political arena.
So our data is from the phase where national elections were more intensely fought. All of these
factors contribute in making India an interesting candidate for testing our hypotheses.
In several different panel specifications, we obtain that a district which has experienced close
elections tends to exhibit lower income inequality. The same is true in case of income polarization.
We also employ an instrumental variables approach as a robustness check. Our results from this 2–
SLS IV approach are essentially similar to our previous findings. Overall our empirical results —
in the context of India — clearly suggest that greater electoral uncertainty reduces existing income
disparities and promotes the growth of the middle class.
In a way our results seem to highlight some interesting features of the electoral mechanism. The
key issue here is the presence of people who are highly ideologically inclined towards some polit-
ical party or the other. A party which rides to victory on the back of large popular support feels
less inclined to cater to the toiling masses. After all, if the electorate likes the party to begin with,
why should the latter bother working hard to reduce existing disparities? However, if one extends
this to a dynamic setting, the voters would potentially change their opinion over time about the
inactive (and ineffective) incumbent party. The problem often is that the opponent party — the
challenger, so to speak — may not be much of a viable alternative. However, the very realization
that perhaps each political party is ex–ante as good as the other should drive this voter bias close to
nil in expected terms thus inducing better promises (and action) from both parties in future. This
would be an interesting avenue to explore.
The fact is that parties themselves change their stand and nature over time. This makes any kind
of convergence on part of voter biases quite unlikely. Incidentally, voter biases in regions tend
to persist over time. For example, in the context of the US, New York has traditionally been a
Democrat stronghold. In India as well, this kind of party loyalty is fairly common — for e.g.,
West Bengal (a state in eastern India) had been under the rule of a Left–led coalitional government
for over 30 years. There may be clientelistic relationships which develop between incumbents
and certain sections of the voters (see Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999), Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2012), etc.) which create such long spells of governance by a party; perhaps longer than what a
dynamic extension of our simple model (with updating of voter biases) would predict.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore how different political parties have re–invented them-
selves over time and what impact has this had on their loyalists — perhaps the conservatives of
today would have been liberal half a century ago. A more holistic view of the interplay between
party evolution and changing voter loyalities could provide meaningful insights to policy–making.
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APPENDIX
LEMMA 1:
Proof. Suppose not and w.l.o.g. assume that ρn > 1 (see Equation (3)). This immediately implies
xnk(A) < x
n
k(B) for every k ∈ {1, ..., K} by the strict concavity of u and violates RAn = RBn .
Hence, we have ρn = 1 which in turn implies xnk(A) = x
n
k(B) for every k ∈ {1, ..., K}, i.e.,
xn(A) = xn(B) and di = 0 for every i in district n.
LEMMA 2:
Proof. Suppose {RAn , RBn }Nn=1 is part of an equilibrium allocation This implies, for every n, the
following necessary first-order conditions (for parties A and B) have to be met.
For party A:
(5) Prob.(
∑
d6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2). ∂Pn
∂RAn
= λ′
For party B:
(6) − Prob.(
∑
d6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2). ∂Pn
∂RBn
= µ′
Note, λ′ and µ′ are the associated (positive) lagrange multipliers. Recall
Pn =
∑
i∈In
pi =
∑
i∈In
[1− Fi(di)].
Hence, by the chain rule, we have:
∂Pn
∂RAn
=
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈In(k)
∂pi
∂xnk(A)
∂xnk(A)
∂RAn
=
K∑
k=1
∂xnk(A)
∂RAn
[ ∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(A))fi(di)
]
and
∂Pn
∂RBn
=
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈In(k)
− ∂pi
∂xnk(B)
∂xnk(B)
∂RBn
=
K∑
k=1
−∂x
n
k(B)
∂RBn
[ ∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(B))fi(di)
]
.
We can re-write ∂Pn
∂RAn
and ∂Pn
∂RBn
as:
∂Pn
∂RAn
=
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(A)
∂RAn
[
1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(A))fi(di)
]
∂Pn
∂RBn
=
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(B)
∂RBn
[
− 1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk(B))fi(di)
]
.
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Using the relations from equations (1) and (2), we get, for every n:
∂Pn
∂RAn
=
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(A)
∂RAn
.λn = λn
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(A)
∂RAn
∂Pn
∂RBn
=
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(B)
∂RBn
.(−µn) = −µn
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(B)
∂RBn
Moreover, in equilibrium we must have
∑K
k=1m
n
k .x
n
k(j) = R
j
n for j = A,B. Hence,
K∑
k=1
mnk .
∂xnk(j)
∂Rjn
= 1
for every n and k. Substituting these relations into the expressions for ∂Pn
∂RAn
and ∂Pn
∂RBn
obtained
above, yield:
∂Pn
∂RAn
= λn
and
∂Pn
∂RBn
= −µn.
Hence, substituting these relations back into equations (5) and (6) we get:
(7) Prob.(
∑
d6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2).λn = λ′
and
(8) Prob.(
∑
d 6=n
zd = (N − 1)/2).µn = µ′.
This, in turn, implies
(9)
λn
µn
= ρn =
λ′
µ′
for every n. In other words, the value of ρn is the same across all the N districts. This implies
ρn must be unity for every n; otherwise the aggregate balanced-budget condition
∑N
n=1R
A
n =∑N
n=1R
B
n is violated. Hence, R
A
n = R
B
n for every n.
LEMMA 3:
Proof. Suppose that both xn and zn satisfy the equilibrium condition outlined above in Equation
(4). The strict concavity of u immediately delivers that xn = zn. A unique xn for every district n
automatically implies a unique corresponding Rn by
∑K
k=1m
n
k .x
n
k = R
.
n
OBSERVATION 1:
Proof. Given that the districts look identical in terms of income distribution and ideology distribu-
tion, it is clear that {Rn}Nn=1 = 0 can be supported in equilibrium. It remains to show that it is the
unique equilibrium district-level allocation possible.
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Suppose there is an equilibrium with {Rn}Nn=1 6= 0. Clearly, there exists districts s and t such that
Rs > 0 and Rt < 0. Hence, ∃k ∈ {1, ..., K} such that xsk 6= xtk. But this violates Equation (4)
since districts s and t have the same income distribution and ideology distribution.
OBSERVATION 2:
Proof. The homogeneity in ideology distribution implies (from Equation (4)) the following for
every k and for every n:
f(0).
1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk) = λ.
Now, by the definition of “poorer”, y′i ≤ yi ∀i in every group k ∈ {1, ..., K} with strict inequality
for some k; call such a group k′. Let xnk denote the transfer to any group k ∈ {1, ..., K} initially
and znk the same afterwards. From the equation above, it must be that z
n
k ≥ xnk with the inequality
strict for the group k′, given the strict concavity of u. Thus,
∑K
k=1m
n
k .x
n
k <
∑K
k=1m
n
k .z
n
k . This
establishes the observation.
OBSERVATION 3:
Proof. Consider two districts s and t where f s(0) > f t(0); hence, s is more swing than t. Suppose
that s and t are otherwise identical.28 In this context, Equation (4) takes the form:
fn(0).
1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k)
u′(yi + xnk) = λ
for n = s, t and for every group k. This makes it clear that xsk > x
t
k for every group k, given the
strict concavity of u. Thus,
∑K
k=1m
s
k.x
s
k >
∑K
k=1m
t
k.x
t
k. This establishes the observation.
OBSERVATION 4:
Proof. Recall the FOSD ordering of groupwise income distributions, so that k = 1 denotes the
poorest group and k = K is the richest. Pick any two groups k1, k2 ∈ {1, ..., K} such that k1 < k2.
Further, let the set Y (kj) ≡ {yi}i∈In(kj) contain the income of every individual in group kj , for
j = 1, 2. So, |Y (kj)| = mkj . We claim:
(10)
1
mnk1
∑
i∈In(k1)
u′(yi) >
1
mnk2
∑
i∈In(k2)
u′(yi).
Given the FOSD assumption for the groups k1 and k2, there are two possibilities: (a) The sets
Y (k1) and Y (k2) are disjoint and (b) they have a non-empty intersection.
For case (a), FOSD implies that all incomes in group k2 exceed the highest income in group k1.
Hence, given that u is concave, Equation (10) follows.
Consider, case (b). Here, there are some individuals in group k1 who earn the same as some
others in group k2. Pick the largest of these sets and call it I(k1k2); denote the number of such
28Specifically, we require them to have the same income distribution.
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individuals by m, i.e., |I(k1k2)| = m.29 Let ψ denote 1m
∑
i∈I(k1k2) u
′(yi). Now consider the sets
In(k1) \ I(k1k2) and In(k2) \ I(k1k2). The income distribution pertaining to these sets are like in
case (a). Let ψkj =
1
mnkj
−m
∑
i∈In(kj)\I(k1k2) u
′(yi) for j = 1, 2. By the argument in case (a), we
have ψk1 > ψk2 .
Now, 1
mnk1
∑
i∈In(k1) u
′(yi) can be written as
mnk1 −m
mnk1
.ψk1 +
m
mnk1
.ψ.
Also, 1
mnk2
∑
i∈In(k2) u
′(yi) can be written as
mnk2 −m
mnk2
.ψk2 +
m
mnk2
.ψ.
Noting ψk1 > ψk2 , we have that Equation (10) is satisfied.
This establishes the claim made in Equation (10). Note, by Equation (4), 1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k) u
′(yi + xnk)
is equalized across k. This delivers xnk1 > x
n
k2
thus establishing the observation.
PROPOSITION 2:
Proof. Consider two districts s and t where f s(0) > f t(0); hence, s is more swing than t. Suppose
that s and t are otherwise identical, like in Observation 3. We know from Observation 3 that
xsk > x
t
k for every group k.
Pick any group k ∈ {1, ..., K}. Note, every i ∈ In(k) is has more income (post-transfer) in district
s than t. Also, the absolute difference in incomes between i and any other member j in group k is
the same in both s and t: namely, |yi−yj|. However, the difference in u′(yi) and u′(yj) is (weakly)
lower in s as compared to t since u′′′ ≥ 0. Thus, there is greater equalization of incomes within
group k as one moves from t to s. Note, this is true for every k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
This leads us to the question of across–group income equalization. Observation 4 tells us that
poorer groups get higher transfers. Using Equation (4), we note 1
mnk
∑
i∈In(k) u
′(yi + xnk) is equal-
ized across k: this is true for both n = s and n = t. So, in terms of equalization of incomes across
the K groups, both s and t perform similarly.
So, overall there is greater equalization of incomes in district s than t. This completes the proof.
29By the set I(k1k2) we mean those individuals from group k1 who earn the same incomes as some others in group
k2 if the former are smaller in number than the ones in the latter group, and vice versa. Hence, set I(k1k2) denotes the
smaller of the two overlapping sets and strictly speaking contains either members from group k1 or from k2. However,
by a slight abuse of notation, we use I(k1k2) to just identify those income-earners who are “common” to both groups
in the sense of earning the same incomes.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Winning Margin 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001)
Voteshare of winner 0.076** 0.078**
(0.030) (0.031)
Population 7.785** 7.931** 0.398***
(3.094) (3.138) (0.139)
Rural Population (percentage) -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.004***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.001)
Hindu Population (percentage) -0.013 -0.017 -0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.001)
SC Population (percentage) -0.024 -0.027 -0.001
(0.031) (0.031) (0.002)
ST Population (percentage) -0.093*** -0.089** -0.006***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.002)
Headcount poverty rate 0.040** 0.040** 0.002*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.001)
Observations 537 537 537 537 537 537
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.275 0.159 0.272 0.030 0.140
TABLE 10. Linear panel regression with 3 NSS rounds (43rd, 55th and 61st).
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) — (4) is the Gini coefficient; in columns
(5) — (6) the dependent variable is the Foster–Wolfson Polarization measure. All
regressions contain district fixed effects and time dummies. Robust standard er-
rors clustered by district in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5%
***significant at 1%.
Margin Vote share Average margin Average vote share Swing Congress
Vote share 0.7601 1
Average margin 0.725 0.5438 1
Average vote share 0.5377 0.7158 0.7923 1
Swing Congress -0.1524 -0.0892 -0.1361 -0.0787 1
TABLE 11. Raw correlations between proxies for “swing”. Notes: The variables
for the two periods have been pooled together. Hence 358 observations in all cases.
